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Abstract
China is engaged in longstanding cyber espionage against the U.S., as
well as other nations, to collect sensitive public and private information
in support of national objectives laid out in its 12th Five Year Plan.
Foreign governments citing China’s malfeasance have rebuked these
activities, a claim vehemently denied by Beijing. In response, China is
leveraging the “Three Warfares” an integrated three-prong information
warfare strategy to combat these accusations by leveraging Media,
Legal, and Psychological components designed to influence the
international community. While the United States has threatened the
imposition of economic sanctions, Beijing has successfully parried
consequential actions by arresting U.S.-identified hackers, thereby
demonstrating its commitment toward preserving a stable and peaceful
cyberspace. These interrelated “Three Warfares” disciplines have
targeted the cognitive processes of the U.S. leadership, as well as the
international public’s perception of China as a global threat, thereby
having successfully forestalled the implementation of any effective
punitive or economic deterrence strategy to include the imposition of
cyber sanctions.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss2/4
 45 
 
Introduction 
China has been allegedly engaged in a longstanding cyber espionage 
campaign against the United States, as well as other nations, soliciting 
negative reactions citing China’s malfeasance.  The negative press received 
from these activities is feeding into the perception that China’s global ‘rise’ is 
predicated on surreptitious intellectual property theft to project it into great 
power status, and perhaps as a way to seek regional and global military 
balance with the United States.  In order to combat this perception, this 
article suggests that China has leveraged its ‘Three Warfares,’ a three-prong 
information warfare approach composed of Media, Legal, and Psychological 
components designed to influence the international community, and the 
United States in particular, in order to forestall the development and 
implementation of any effective counter strategy.  The result has been largely 
successful to date, enabling China to reach specific milestones set forth in its 
national development plans while escaping any serious punitive or economic 
repercussions from the international community, to include recent 
circumvention of U.S.-imposed cyber sanctions.  This article will review 
Chinese cyber activity, international perceptions of the Chinese cyber threat, 
how “Three Warfares” apply to Chinese cyber operations, and then provide 
final conclusions. 
 
Chinese Cyber Activity 
Former National Security Agency (NSA) Director and Commander of U.S. 
Cyber Command General Keith Alexander estimates the losses incurred by 
cyber espionage activities at approximately $338 billion, although admittedly 
not all the result of Chinese efforts.1  Nevertheless, the intimation of this 
assessment is that China, identified as the most persistent cyber espionage 
actor,2 is suspected of a good portion of this activity.  Indeed, the breadth and 
scope of suspected Chinese sponsored and/or directed cyber espionage begs 
the question:  Despite the tactical success of stealing a diverse spectrum of 
sensitive and proprietary information in the face of public protest, what is 
Beijing’s strategic game plan? 
 
                                                     
1 Josh Rogin, “NSA Chief: Cybercrime Constitutes the ‘Greatest Transfer of Wealth in 
History’,” Foreign Policy: The Cable, July 9, 2012, available at:  
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/09/nsa-chief-cybercrime-constitutes-the-greatest-
transfer-of-wealth-in-history/. 
2 “Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace,” Office of the National 
Counterintelligence Executive, October 2011, available at: 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/20111103_
report_fecie.pdf. 
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China has three primary national security objectives: Sustaining regime 
survival, defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and 
establishing China as both a regional and national power.3  China views the 
United States with a cautious mix of skepticism, partnership, and 
competition.  The Chinese believe that the United States is a revisionist power 
seeking to curtail China's political influence and harm China's interests.4  One 
way to counter U.S. supremacy is for China to engage in cyber operations in 
an effort to extract information from “diplomatic, economic and defense 
industrial base sectors that support U.S. national defense programs.”5  In this 
context, cyber operations can be viewed as being more about trying to 
strengthen China’s core and less about diminishing U.S. power.  Focusing 
solely on the United States, suspected Chinese cyber espionage actors have 
targeted the following industries, among others, during the past two years:  
                                                     
3 Colonel Jayson M. Spade, “Information as Power: China’s Cyber Power and America’s 
National Security,” U.S. Army War College, May 2012, available at: 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-072.pdf; 
“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014,” 
Office of the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress, 2014, available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_China_Report.pdf. 
U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, D.C.: OSD, 
2014): V, available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf. 
4 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, “How China Sees America,” Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 2012, available at:  
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138009/andrew-j-nathan-and-andrew-
scobell/how-china-sees-america. 
5 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014.” 
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Space6, Infrastructure7, Energy8, Nuclear Power9, Technology Firms10, Clean 
Energy11, Biotechnology12, and Healthcare.13   
China’s 12th Five Year Plan reflects overall goals and objectives of the 
government to promote economic industry growth.  It is a critically important 
tool that maps out in five-year cycles the country’s future progress via 
guidelines, policy frameworks, and targets for policy makers at all levels of 
government.14  In the current Five Year Plan, which covers 2011-15, China 
identified seven priority industries to develop, areas in which the United 
States has typically been an innovator and leader.  These “strategic emerging 
industries” are intended to become the backbone of China’s economy in the 
decades ahead.15  These industries are: 
 
 New Energy (nuclear, wind, solar sower) 
 Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection (energy reduction 
targets) 
 Biotechnology (drugs and medical devices) 
                                                     
6 John Walcott, “Chinese Espionage Campaign Targets U.S. Space Technology,” 
Bloomberg, April 18, 2012, available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-
18/chinese-espionage-campaign-targets-u-s-space-technology.html. 
7 Tom Simmonite, “Chinese Hacking Team Caught Taking Over Decoy Water Plant,” 
Technology Review, August 2, 2013, available at: 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/517786/chinese-hacking-team-caught-
taking-over-decoy-water-plant/. 
8 Tom Simmonite, “Chinese Hacking Team Caught Taking Over Decoy Water Plant,” 
Technology Review, August 2, 2013, available at: 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/517786/chinese-hacking-team-caught-
taking-over-decoy-water-plant/. 
9 Jennifer Liberto, “New Chinese Hacker Group Targets Governments, Nuclear Facilities,” 
CNN Money, June 4, 2013, available at: 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/04/technology/security/cyber-hacker-
group/index.html. 
10 Stew Magnuson, “Stopping the Chinese Hacking Onslaught,” NDIA, July 2012, 
available at: 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/July/Pages/StoppingtheChin
eseHackingOnslaught.aspx. 
11 Susan D. Hall, “Chinese Hackers Targeting the Healthcare Industry,” FierceHealthIT, 
March 20, 2013, available at: http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/chinese-hackers-
targeting-healthcare-industry/2013-03-20. 
12 Nick Paul Taylor, “Chinese Trial Data Hackers Reportedly Active Again,” Fierce 
BioTechIT, May 27, 2013, available at: http://www.fiercebiotechit.com/story/chinese-
trial-data-hackers-reportedly-active-again/2013-05-27. 
13 Susan D. Hall, “Chinese Hackers Targeting the Healthcare Industry,” FierceHealthIT, 
March 20, 2013, available at: http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/chinese-hackers-
targeting-healthcare-industry/2013-03-20. 
14 “China’s 12th Five Year Plan,” APCO, December 10, 2010, available at: 
http://www.export.gov.il/UploadFiles/03_2012/Chinas12thFive-YearPlan.pdf. 
15 Ibid.  
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 New Materials (rare earths and high-end semiconductors) 
 New IT (broadband networks, Internet security infrastructure, 
network convergence) 
 High-End Equipment Manufacturing (aerospace and telecom 
equipment) 
 Clean Energy Vehicles16 
 
It is easy to see that a correlation can be made between the types of industries 
that have been targeted in the United States in the last two years and the 
strategic emerging industries that China has highlighted for development.  
Moreover, China views cyber as an ideal tool to accomplish these objectives 
being an inexpensive facile technique to engage several potential intelligence 
targets at once.  In February 2007, China National Defense News defined 
cyber warfare as the “use of network technology and methods to struggle for 
an information advantage in the fields of politics, economics, military affairs, 
and technology.”17  The key takeaway here is that cyber warfare is directly 
related to “information advantage” and not military advantage, suggesting 
that peacetime cyber activities are more about bolstering China’s 
development in strategic areas and less about establishing military superiority 
vis-a-vis reconnoitering a future battle space.  
 
The Perceived Chinese Cyber Threat  
While some experts believe that the United States, along with China and 
Russia, are engaged in a cyber arms race,18 China has yet to be suspected or 
implicated in an incident involving the destruction of information systems or 
the information resident on them.  Many Chinese strategic military writings 
advocate the use of information warfare as a pre-emptive weapon prior to the 
onset of military engagements;19 however, if China is behind the volume of 
cyber espionage activity attributed to it, during peacetime China prefers to 
leverage the benefit of computer intrusions as a means of information 
collection and commercial advantage, rather than one of deterrence.   
                                                     
16 “China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: Overview,” KPMG China, March 2011, available at: 
http://www.kpmg.com/cn/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Chi
na-12th-Five-Year-Plan-Overview-201104.pdf. 
17 Robyn E. Ferguson, “Information Warfare with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Future 
View of Information Warfare and Strategic Culture,” (Dissertation), 15. 
18 Robert Windrem, “Expert: U.S. In Cyber Arms Race With China, Russia,” NBC News 
Investigations, February 20, 2013, available at: 
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/20/17022378-expert-us-in-
cyberwar-arms-race-with-china-russia. 
19 James Mulvenon, “The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age,” (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 1999), 183. 
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Currently, several countries including Australia, Canada, Germany, India, 
Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, among others, have publicly accused China 
of intruding into their public and private sector networks.20  In particular, the 
United States has been the prime target of suspected Chinese orchestrated or 
directed cyber operations for approximately a dozen years.  While the U.S. 
government maintained a reserved stance for most of this time, in 2012 it 
became more outspoken with regard to the volume of cyber espionage activity 
targeting its public and private sectors.  In October 2011, U.S. Congressman 
Mike Rogers of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
publicly accused China of stealing sensitive information: 
 
“China's economic espionage has reached an intolerable level and I 
believe that the United States and our allies in Europe and Asia have 
an obligation to confront Beijing and demand that they put a stop to 
this piracy.”21 
 
In 2013, the security company Mandiant published a detailed report 
identifying a Chinese military unit involved in cyber espionage.22  Never 
before had technical evidence and analysis linking activities to a government 
entity been made public.  The Mandiant report proved to be a watershed 
moment for senior U.S. government officials with several of them, including 
President Obama, publicly addressing the issue of Chinese cyber espionage. 
Shortly after publication of the Mandiant report, in March 2013, U.S National 
Security Advisor Thomas Donilon stated: 
 
“…businesses are speaking out about their serious concerns about 
sophisticated targeted theft of confidential business information and 
proprietary information through cyber intrusions emanating from 
China.”23  
 
                                                     
20 Timothy L. Thomas, “Google Confronts China’s Three Warfares,” Parameters 40:2 
(Summer 2010), available at: 
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2010summer/Tho
mas.pdf. 
21 “Lawmaker: China Engaging in Cyber Spying,” Fox News, October 4, 2011, available at: 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2011/10/04/lawmaker-china-engaging-in-
cyber-spying/. 
22 “APT 1: Exposing one of China’s Espionage Units,” Mandiant, available at: 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf. 
23 Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” The Asia Society, 
March 11, 2013, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-
states-a. 
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In that same month, President Obama engaged directly with Chinese 
President Xi Jinping about cyber security and future engagement 
possibilities,24 which was followed by a summit in June, where the two leaders 
more fully discussed cyber security, with Obama opting not to directly accuse 
the Chinese leader of espionage activity.25  However, any headway was 
derailed in May 2014 when the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five 
Chinese military officers with committing cyber espionage, the first time ever 
the U.S. government publicly accused members of a foreign government with 
crimes against U.S. companies.26  Further reports of another suspected 
Chinese espionage group like ‘Axiom’,27 reputed to be more sophisticated than 
the one profiled in the Mandiant report, further paints a condemning picture 
of China as a relentless cyber thief of sensitive information.  Given the 
voluminous cyber incidents pointing toward some level of Chinese 
government affiliation, Beijing finds itself trying to sustain its ‘peaceful rise’ 
image in the midst of growing global public dissent, led at the spear tip by the 
United States and its threat of imposing cyber sanctions against those entities 
that benefited from commercial espionage activities. 
 
Three Warfares – A Primer 
It seems counterproductive for a country so concerned with ‘face’ to engage in 
such blatant and aggressive activities that threaten to harm its global image.  
Two important concepts in Chinese culture are guanxi and mianzi.  The first, 
guanxi, has been defined as sharing favors between individuals, connections, 
relationships, and the ability to exert influence.  The second, mianzi, means 
‘face,’ as in saving face, losing face, and giving face.28  So why would a country 
steeped in this mindset willingly risk its image, especially at a time when the 
country is seen as a peacefully rising world economic power? 
 
                                                     
24 Steve Howard, “Obama, China’s Xi Discuss Cybersecurity Dispute on Phone Call,” 
Reuters, March 14, 2013, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-
usa-china-obama-call-idUSBRE92D11G20130314. 
25 M. Alex Johnson and Matthew DeLuca, “Obama Takes Diplomatic Tack on Chinese 
Cyberespionage Charges,” NBC News, June 7, 2013, available at: 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18804533-obama-takes-diplomatic-
tack-on-chinese-cyberespionage-charges. 
26 Devlin Barrett and Siobhan Gorman, “U.S. Charges Five in Chinese Military of 
Hacking,” The Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2014, available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304422704579571604060696532. 
27 Adam Segal, “Axiom and the Deepening Divide in U.S.-China Relations,” Council on 
Foreign Relations Blog, October 29, 2014, available at: 
http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2014/10/29/axiom-and-the-deepening-divide-in-u-s-china-
cyber-relations/. 
28 “China,” Cultural Savvy, available at: http://www.culturalsavvy.com/china.htm. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss2/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.2.1489
 51 
 
The implementation of non-kinetic, non-violent, but still offensive operations 
is best suited for Chinese peacetime strategy of influencing the cognitive 
processes of a country’s leadership and population, or what Sun Tzu describes 
as ‘subduing the enemy without fighting.’29  In 2003, the Communist Chinese 
Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission approved the 
concept of ‘Three Warfares,’ a People’s Liberation Army non-military 
information warfare tool to be used in the run up to and during hostilities.30  
Collectively, the ‘Three Warfares’ allow China to enter any fray, whether in 
peace or war, with a political advantage that can be used to alter public or 
international opinion.31  They are: 
 
 Psychological Warfare–Undermines an enemy’s ability to conduct 
combat operations through operations aimed at deterring, shocking, 
and demoralizing the enemy military personnel and supporting 
civilian populations. 32 
 
 Public Opinion/Media Warfare–Influences domestic and 
international public opinion to build support for China’s military 
actions and dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to 
China’s interests. 33 
 
 Legal Warfare–Uses international and domestic law to claim the legal 
high ground or assert Chinese interests.  It can be employed to 
hamstring an adversary’s operational freedom and shape the 
operational space.  Legal warfare is also intended to build 
international support and manage possible political repercussions of 
China’s military actions. 34 
 
Media warfare incorporates the mechanism for messages to be delivered, 
while legal warfare provides the justification of why actions are permissible.  
Psychological warfare provides the necessary nuance leveraging the 
dissemination capability of the media and the more formalized legal 
mechanisms to substantiate its activities to domestic and international 
                                                     
29 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, available at: 
http://www.theartofwar.ws/The_Art_of_War.pdf. 
30 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” 
Office of the Secretary of Defense Annual Report to Congress, 2011: 26, available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf. 
31 Timothy  L. Thomas, “Google Confronts China’s Three Warfares.” 
32 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” 
26.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
Iasiello: China’s Three Warfares Strategy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
 52 
 
audiences.  Given that each of these types of warfare rely on the targeting and 
influencing of a specific target audience, it is easy to see why Chinese analyses 
almost always link these three types of ‘combat’ together.35   
 
Public Opinion/Media Warfare 
Public opinion warfare refers to the use of various information channels, 
including the Internet, television, radio, newspapers, movies, and other forms 
of media in accordance with an overall plan and defined objectives to transmit 
selected news and other materials to an intended audience.36  The goals are to 
preserve friendly morale, generate public support at home and abroad, 
weaken the enemy’s will to fight, and alter the enemy’s situational 
assessment.  Defensive public opinion warfare is leveraged against adversarial 
public opinion warfare to neutralize possible effects on the Chinese 
populace.37  Given the voluminous hacking allegations levied against China, 
defensive public opinion warfare is a natural counterbalance. 
 
According to Cheng, four themes are inherent in Chinese writings on public 
opinion38: 
 
 Follow Top-Down Guidance–The senior leadership will dictate 
courses of action based on strategic objectives.  
 
 Emphasize Preemption–Chinese analyses of public opinion warfare 
emphasize that “the first to sound grabs people, the first to enter 
establishes dominance (xian sheng duoren, xianru weizhu).”  
 
 Be Flexible and Responsive to Changing Conditions–Use of different 
propaganda activities depending on the audience. “One must make 
distinctions between the more stubborn elements and the general 
populace.” 
 
 Exploit All Available Resources–Civilian and commercial news assets 
such as news organizations, broadcasting facilities, Internet users, etc., 
                                                     
35 Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: Chinese Public Opinion Warfare and the 
Need for a Robust American Response,” The Heritage Foundation,  No. 2745, November 
26, 2012, available at: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/11/winning-
without-fighting-chinese-public-opinion-warfare-and-the-need-for-a-robust-american-
response. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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are seen as an invaluable resource in getting China’s message before 
domestic and global audiences.  
 
Public criticism over Beijing-sponsored intrusions surfaced as early as 2005 
when it was revealed that suspected Chinese government intrusions dubbed 
‘Titan Rain’ had been targeting U.S. public and private sectors entities since 
2003.39  Since that time, numerous foreign governments have gradually come 
out publicly to identify the Chinese government, or its operatives, as 
perpetrators of intrusion activity against their networks.40  Furthermore, U.S. 
government entities have long suspected Chinese telecommunications 
companies Huawei and ZTE as being instruments of the state, and possible 
mediums that can be leveraged by the Chinese government for intelligence 
collection.41  Such debate has risen to the highest levels as seen in 2013 
meetings between Chinese president Xi Jinping and U.S. President Barack 
Obama.42  In 2014, Secretary of Defense Charles Hagel disclosed U.S. cyber 
force structure and capabilities to China in an effort to demonstrate military 
transparency.43 
 
Chinese Public Opinion / Media Warfare Applications to Cyberspace 
Chinese response has evolved during this period in which it has been framed 
as an antagonistic cyber presence.  Typically, China has met such accusations 
with a defensive posture, denying allegations and asking for more information 
in an attempt to help track down the perpetrators.  Indeed, senior official 
                                                     
39 Nathan Thornburg, “The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies,” Time, August 29, 2005, 
available at: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1098961-1,00.html. 
40 Jason Koutsoukis, “Chinese Waging Online Spy War;” The Age, February 10, 2008, 
available at: http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/chinese-waging-online-spy-
war/2008/02/09/1202234232007.html; Roger Boyes, “China Accused of Hacking into 
Heart of Merkel Administration,” The Times, August 27, 2007, available at: 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/europe/article2595759.ece; Donna 
Buenaventura, “China Tried to Hack Our Computers, Says India Security Chief M.K. 
Narayanan,” The Times Online, January 18, 2010, available at: 
http://blogs.msmvps.com/donna/2010/01/18/china-tried-to-hack-our-computers-
says-india-s-security-chief-m-k-narayanan/. 
41 Nathan Ingraham, “US Government Claims Huawei and ZTE Pose a Risk to National 
Security: the Accusations, Responses, and Fallout,” The Verge, October 11, 2012, available 
at: http://www.theverge.com/2012/10/11/3488584/huawei-zte-us-government-
security-investigation. 
42 “Admit Nothing and Deny Everything,” The Economist, June 6, 2013, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21579044-barack-obama-says-he-ready-talk-
xi-jinping-about-chinese-cyber-attacks-makes-one. 
43 Joe McReynolds, “Cyber Transparency for Thee, But Not for Me,” The Jamestown 
Foundation China Brief, 14: 8, available at: 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42246&no_cache=1#.VTfXN
BdSxdY . 
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statements issued from China’s Ministry of Defense,44 Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs,45 and its Prime Minister46 have towed the same party line, asserting 
that China is not behind the attacks, that China is a victim not a perpetrator of 
cyber-crime activity, and that China’s laws strictly identify hacking as illegal.47 
 
However, China shifted to a more assertive stance once former NSA 
contractor Edward Snowden released alleged highly classified documents 
exposing U.S. global surveillance efforts.  Instead of trying to deflect 
accusations, China now points its own finger at the U.S. government.  In 
particular, Beijing has demanded an explanation from the United States over 
reports of NSA spying on the Chinese company Huawei.48  The irony is not 
lost on China, given earlier U.S. government concerns over Huawei’s 
suspected spying on behalf of the Chinese government, which was ultimately 
not proven after a study was conducted on behalf of the U.S. Congressman 
and Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Mike Rogers.49  Although skeptics persisted, in October 2012, the White 
House conducted its own security review of Huawei and found no clear 
evidence that Huawei spied on behalf of the Chinese government.50  Further 
pushing U.S. cyber malfeasance into the spotlight, in March 2014, China’s 
National Computer Emergency Response Team identified the United States 
as the top source of intrusion activity against its computers.51  
                                                     
44 Charles Riley, “China’s Military Denies Hacking Allegations,” CNNMoney, February 
20, 2013, available at: http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/20/technology/china-cyber-
hacking-denial/. 
45 David Barboza, “China Says Army Is Not Behind Attacks in Report,” The New York 
Times, February 21, 2013, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/business/global/china-says-army-not-behind-
attacks-in-report.html?_r=0. 
46 “Espionage Report: Merkel’s China Visit Marred by Hacking Allegations,” Spiegel 
Online, August 27, 2007, available at: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/espionage-report-merkel-s-china-visit-
marred-by-hacking-allegations-a-502169.html. 
47 “M Trends 2014: Beyond the Breach,” Mandiant, available at: 
https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/library/WP_M-Trends2014_140409.pdf. 
48 Liz Peek, “U.S. and China in a Lethal Game of Cyber Chess,” The Fiscal Times, April 9, 
2014, available at: http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Blogs/Peek-POV/2014/04/09/US-
and-China-Lethal-Game-Cyber-Chess. 
49 Mike Rogers and Dutch Ruppersberger, “Investigative Report on the U.S. National 
Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei Technologies 
and ZTE,” U.S. House of Representatives, October 8, 2012, available at: 
https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Huawei-
ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20%28FINAL%29.pdf. 
50 “Huawei: Leaked Report Shows No Evidence of Spying,” BBC News, October 18, 2012, 
available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19988919. 
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U.S. efforts to manage its public image have fallen short after allies and 
adversaries alike expressed outrage from the Snowden scandal.52  The subtle 
nuance from which the U.S. government bases its defense, namely that it 
conducts such activities to support national security interests and not to 
provide competitive advantage to U.S. corporations, seems trite, particularly 
after being caught with its hand in the proverbial cyber cookie jar.  Several 
accusations have surfaced because of leaked documents pointing to the NSA 
spying on non-national security entities such as Brazil’s biggest oil company,53 
the European Union commissioner investigating Google, Microsoft, and 
Intel,54 and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.55  Even on its 
home front, the U.S. public and special interest groups seeking to preserve 
civil liberties have condemned NSA activities.56 
 
While the U.S. seemed to have an upper hand and international support 
regarding suspected Chinese cyber espionage, China has successfully regained 
some of its public facing pride.  China continues to promote itself as a cyber 
victim as well as a willing cyber security partner.  In 2014, China expressed its 
desire for mutual cyber cooperation with the United States,57 and as of April 
2014, the Pentagon has engaged in military exchanges with China in the spirit 
of military transparency.58   
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Despite ongoing allegations of Chinese cyber misconduct, China has made 
strides in somewhat polishing its tarnished image at the timely expense of 
U.S. secret cyber activities.  Perhaps in light of this, in May 2014, the U.S. 
Justice Department indicted five Chinese military hackers for cyber 
espionage.59  While this landmark decision attempted to directly implicate 
China’s government with cyber espionage, it failed to incriminate China any 
more in the public’s eye.  After all, many public and private organizations 
generally believe that the Chinese government steals intellectual properties 
and sensitive information.  Rather, the onslaught of exposed highly sensitive 
documents revealing the U.S. government’s role in similar activity (against 
allied and adversary governments alike) proved to be a bigger injustice and a 
black mark against a government advocating human rights and individual 
freedoms. 
 
Legal warfare 
Legal warfare is one of the key instruments of psychological and public 
opinion warfare.60  Legal warfare is typically used in conjunction with one or 
both of the other two types of warfare as maximum effectiveness is achieved 
when they build upon each other.  In this way, legal warfare provides the basis 
that strengthens public opinion warfare and psychological warfare.61  By 
definition, legal warfare is designed to provide justification for a course of 
action.   
 
There are two influences that help form Chinese legal warfare: 
 
 Chinese Views of the Role and Rule of Law–Historical and cultural 
considerations inform the Chinese government’s understanding of 
legal warfare.  Confucianism and Legalist influences were integral to 
imperialist China but as the government evolved during Mao’s tenure, 
Marxist perspectives advocated that the “law should serve as an 
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ideological instrument of politics.”62 Today, there is a focus on 
commercial and contract law, while criminal law remains weak.63 
 
 Chinese Perception of Legal Warfare in the West–China perceives that 
importance of Western interests to use law as justification for its 
actions.  In the first Gulf War, the United States obtained U.N. 
authorization for sanctions as well as use of force in Iraq, while in 
Kosovo, it argued that its actions were “consistent with the law” 
because they were taken under NATO auspices.64  Being able to use 
rule of law or its legal perceptions to justify actions is a powerful tool 
in Chinese thinking. 
 
Chinese legal warfare applications to cyberspace 
As a mode of influence, legal warfare is typically used prior to the outbreak of 
physical conflict, and occurs only in context of actual warfare.  However, since 
the international spotlight has shifted to cyber espionage activities and China 
has been called out as a perpetrator of intellectual property theft, evidence 
suggests that the Chinese may be using tenets of legal warfare to push 
strategic interests.  The following events occurred after several governments 
publicly blamed China for hacking into their networks and stealing data: 
 
 2014 U.S. Plans to Relinquish Internet Control–In December 2012, 
China along with Russia gained international support to have all states 
have equal rights to the governance of the Internet.  The agreement 
updated 24-year-old U.N. telecommunications rules.65  While non-
binding, eighty-nine countries signed it with 55 reserving the right to 
sign it at a later date,66 showing the widespread support.  This 
initiative continued the necessary steps for the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) to play an active role in the multi-
stakeholder model of the Internet.67  Such efforts, coupled with the 
leaking of sensitive documents pertaining to the National Security 
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Agency’s alleged global surveillance, applied considerable pressure on 
the United States to back away from supporting the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’ (ICANN) influence on 
Internet controls.68  Gaining international support and using the ITU 
as an authorized body gave these efforts the auspice of legitimacy.  As 
of January 2016, U.S. officials remained committed to relinquishing 
federal government control over the administration of the Internet by 
September.69  
 
 2011/2015 China-Russia Letters to the United Nations–Since there 
are no official international laws or even common definitions 
governing cyber activity, China has been a prominent voice in 
advocating for norms of behavior for nation states.  In 2011, China 
teamed up with Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to submit an 
international code of conduct for information security to the U.N.,70 
and updated it in January 2015.71  Essentially, the core of both 
proposals highlighted identifying the rights and responsibilities of 
states in the information space, as well as promoting their constructive 
and responsible behaviors to enhance their cooperation in addressing 
common threats and challenges.  Although as of this writing, the 
proposal is still being reviewed by member states, China did assume a 
leading international role in trying to establish behavior norms for 
nation states using an international body as a validating entity of its 
efforts.  
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 2009 Updating of Chinese Cybercrime Legislation–China has 
maintained publicly that hacking is against Chinese laws.72  In 2009, 
China extended penalties for those convicted of cybercriminal 
activities.73  When accused of sponsoring hacking, China is quick to 
cite its laws as a legal justification of why it does not engage in that 
activity.74  
 
China uses international organizations like the UN, whose authorization is 
backed by legal considerations, in order to give its efforts legitimacy.  This 
ultimately serves two important strategic objectives:  1) It tempers the 
negative image of China as a hacking state by showing that it is seeking to 
work collectively and within the defined rules of established international 
organizations, and 2) It helps China implement non-kinetic asymmetric 
means to pursue its political and economic objectives, avoiding the need to 
use military force or influence, thereby reducing the risk of potential 
escalation over a given issue.   
 
Chinese psychological warfare 
Psychological Warfare is deeply rooted in Chinese strategy; for example, 
“Chinese writings posit that during peacetime, psychological operations seek 
to reveal and exploit divisions in the enemy’s domestic political establishment 
or alliance system and cast doubt on the enemy’s value concepts.”75  It aims 
for a high degree of precision in targeting critical nodes in order to achieve 
nonlinear effects.  
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Chinese psychological warfare applications to cyberspace 
According to Chinese scholars, psychological warfare is an integral part of 
information warfare.76  However, defining information warfare in a Chinese 
context is more challenging, as there is not a published doctrine on 
information warfare and there are only Chinese doctrinal writings available to 
provide insight into this complex discipline.  Early writings on the subject 
were largely borrowed from translated United States, Russian, French, and 
German doctrines.77  As time has passed, there have been developments in 
Chinese thinking with regard to information warfare, most notably with 
regard to the concept of ‘information dominance,’ which according to Chinese 
cyber expert Dr. James Mulvenon, is the main objective of Chinese 
information warfare strategy.78  Information dominance has two primary 
targets: The physical information infrastructure and the data that has passed 
through it, and perhaps more importantly, the human agents that interact 
with those data, especially those making decisions.79 
 
According to Chinese writings, there are five broad tasks associated with 
psychological warfare.80  Taking into consideration China’s involvement in 
global intrusion activity, these tasks may be applied to the current 
environment in the following manner: 
 
1) Presenting Your Own Side as Just—China is very much concerned 
with its public image, which makes its ambivalence toward the 
negative publicity surrounding suspected hacking activity curious.  All 
attempts to ‘blame and shame’ China have ended in a resounding 
failure, which can be attributed to the fact that China has established 
and maintained the same official position, regardless of what 
government is finger pointing.  Beijing typically parries such claims by 
consistently denying hacking allegations and then immediately 
pointing out that they are the victims of hacking.81  Further, as noted 
                                                     
76 Dean Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare 
Challenge,” The Heritage Foundation, No. 2821, July 11, 2011, available at: 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/winning-without-fighting-the-
chinese-psychological-warfare-challenge. 
77 Ferguson, “Information Warfare with Chinese Characteristics,” 31. 
78 James Mulvenon, “The PLA and Information Warfare,” in The People’s Liberation 
Army in the Information Age, James Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (eds.) (Washington, 
DC: RAND, 1999): 180. 
79 Cheng, “Winning Without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological Warfare Challenge.” 
80 Guo Yanhua, Psychological Warfare Knowledge (Beijing: National Defense University 
Press, 2005), 14-16. 
81 “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of 
China After Bilateral Meeting,” The White House, June 8, 2013, available at: 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 9, No. 2
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss2/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.2.1489
 61 
 
earlier, Beijing frequently cites that hacking is against the law in 
China,82 trying to show that, as a country, it is doing its part to best 
address hostile activities in cyberspace through legal channels.  Lastly, 
China in partnership with Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, 
proposed before the United Nations (UN) a code of conduct in 
cyberspace for nation states,83 and updated it in February 2015 after it 
had received input from member states.84  This achieved two 
important objectives: 1.) It showed China being proactive in trying to 
establish an international set of responsible behavior norms for nation 
states in cyberspace; and 2.) It demonstrated China’s willingness to 
collaborate with others as equals.  The proposal tendered at the UN 
further demonstrated China’s desire to gain consensus among the 
international community.  Taken collectively, these efforts can be 
interpreted as China’s mitigation of the negative press it receives by 
presenting itself as responsible and collaborative.  The proactive desire 
to collaborate with other governments on such issues may have been 
the impetus to lead the United States in June 2015 to agree to 
negotiate with China on some kind of “code of conduct” in 
cyberspace.85  
 
2) Emphasizing One’s Advantages—In 2014, China became the world’s 
largest economy.  China’s gross domestic product blistered from 2003-
13, averaging more than 10 percent a year.86  While the United States 
has kept Chinese companies at bay from penetrating U.S. markets, 
China has enthusiastically pursued other markets where the U.S. has 
typically enjoyed a trade advantage.  Recently, China overtook the 
United States as Africa’s and Brazil’s largest trade partner. 87   This has 
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translated into economic advantages regardless of negative press about 
alleged Chinese hacking.  These countries simply do not care about the 
threat, seeing economic engagement and accelerated infrastructure 
development as outweighing any potential consequence.  Brazil is 
welcoming more Chinese private customers as active players in more 
diversified ways of bilateral economic cooperation,88 and in Africa, 
China has been the leading supplier of telecommunications 
equipment.89  The stigma placed on the Chinese telecommunications 
company Huawei is a perfect example of China playing to its strengths. 
Despite the suspicions leveled largely by the U.S. government that 
Huawei may act as an agent of the Chinese government, the House-
driven study didn’t yield any conclusive proof of espionage.  
Furthermore, the company is “the second largest telecommunications 
provider in the world, with deployed products and solutions in over 
140 countries, indicating that several countries in the world are not as 
concerned with Huawei posing an intelligence threat.” 90 Even U.S. 
allies Australia and the UK appear not to levy the same level of 
concerns as the United States.  The UK’s Huawei Advisory Board–an 
entity composed of both members of the UK’s intelligence service 
GCHQ staff, governmental employees, and members of industry, as 
well as Huawei personnel–concluded after an audit that Huawei’s 
work in the UK did not pose a national security threat.91  In 2013, 
Huawei supported the creation of an Australian Cyber Security Center 
development to test the security credentials being implemented into 
critical infrastructure.92 
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3) Undermining the Opposition’s Will to Resist—There have been several 
writings on the China cyber threat by civilian and government 
regional, cultural, and functional experts, in addition to international 
media and print news channels covering the topic.  In each instance, 
two resounding messages are conveyed: 1) The Chinese cyber threat is 
massive and pervasive representing the largest transfer of wealth in 
human history,93 and 2) China seeks access to computer networks to 
not only steal sensitive information but also to establish “information 
dominance.”94   Whether described as being sophisticated, 
rudimentary, or somewhere in between, Chinese espionage activity has 
been constant and persistent.  Even the term “advanced persistent 
threat,” given to it purportedly by the U.S. Air Force in 2006 to be able 
to discuss it with unclassified personnel,95 portrays the adversary as 
skilled and relentless, and considering its lack of covertness, fearless as 
well.  The fact that there have been few consequences suffered by the 
alleged Chinese cyber operatives for their actions lends further support 
to the notion that they cannot be beat, or at the very least, their brazen 
activity cannot be stopped.  As Richard Clarke said, “Every major 
company in the United States has already been penetrated by China.”96  
Coming from a man considered the first cyber czar in the U.S. 
government, such platitudes further paint the adversary as a nearly 
unbeatable opponent. 
 
4) Encouraging Dissension in the Enemy’s Camp—This task focuses on 
disrupting the cognitive processes of policymakers and decision 
makers, inhibiting their ability to develop a plan of action.  The theory 
suggests that the best strategy is to attack the enemy’s mind, leaving 
him unable to plan,97 which given U.S. policymakers’ history of not 
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being in accordance on cyber issues, makes them a prime exploitable 
target.  One thing is clear: Since suspected Chinese cyber espionage 
was first discovered in 2003,98 there has been no concrete course of 
action as to how to handle Chinese cyber espionage until the United 
States’ creation of cyber sanctions, an effort to deter all grave cyber 
activities, but in particular, those believed to be conducted or endorsed 
by China.99  Previously, agencies supported various courses of action. 
There were proponents of “active cyber defense” such as U.S. Cyber 
Command100 and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency101 
as a means to deter adversaries in cyberspace.  However, there were 
some like U.S. Representative Mike Rogers who believed there needed 
to be a viable strong defense in place before engaging in any offensive 
cyber operations.102  Still others, such as the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) cited lack of clearly defined roles and 
responsibilities of federal agencies as a serious impediment to 
productive cyber security.103  Continued failure to establish a strong 
national level cyber security strategy prohibits the U.S. government 
from going down a unified path with all stakeholders understanding 
their part in the process.  Even a February 2013 Executive Order on 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security has not generated 
significant support.  While a positive step, it failed to clearly mandate 
changes, relying on companies’ willingness to comply with the 
measures stated in the order.  Although it did not reference the 
February Order, the GAO in a March report still cited the need of an 
integrated national cyber security strategy complete with milestones, 
performance measures, and Congressional oversight.104  Whether 
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intentionally or not, Chinese cyber espionage campaigns have taken 
advantage of the indecisive climate that had permeated in the U.S. 
government prior to the 2015 agreement between the two 
governments to not hack each other for commercial economic 
advantage. 
 
5) Implementing Psychological Defenses—In the Chinese view, it is 
assumed that an opponent will mount psychological attacks, as well as 
exposing them and defeating them in order to demoralize an opponent 
by demonstrating the ineffectiveness of his efforts.105  China has 
maintained its political stance that it does not conduct hacking.  Even 
after approaching Chinese President Xi Jinping directly about Chinese 
espionage, Xi deflected blame onto poor network security, and not the 
government hacking U.S. targets.  Indeed, when the NSA’s secret 
surveillance program was exposed, China immediately jumped on the 
opportunity of making the U.S. government the bad guy.106  Even the 
much-maligned Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei seized the 
moment to condemn NSA spying and promote a global cyber security 
dialogue.107 
 
When these five psychological warfare tasks are taken collectively, the 
message being promoted is that China is a dominant cyber force.  By denying 
the accusations, China further builds on this image without having to say it 
publicly, or leak into the press its involvement in a significant cyber event..  
After all, unlike the U.S., China has not found the desire or need to bolster its 
image as a dominant player in cyberspace via public announcements or 
national strategies; instead, Beijing has relied upon others to speculate on its 
capabilities and strength, allowing it to concentrate its energies on trying to 
temper negative press while concurrently maintaining its covert espionage 
efforts to support its national objectives. 
 
Dodging U.S. Cyber Sanctions  
While the Chinese cyber espionage activity has enjoyed relative freedom for a 
substantial amount of time, the 2015 state visit put China on notice that cyber 
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espionage for commercial advantage would not be tolerated by the United 
States.  In an effort to avoid these penalties, Beijing reached accord days 
before President Xi’s official state visit to the United States in which both 
agreed that “neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support 
cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other 
confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive 
advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”108   
 
As a result of the agreement, China arrested hackers identified by the United 
States,109 thereby demonstrating its commitment to arresting criminal 
elements in cyberspace, even if they are China’s own citizens.  While opinions 
differ on Beijing’s motives for arresting Chinese hackers, it is not without 
precedent.  In 2010, after a lengthy international coordinated effort, Chinese 
authorities detained a Chinese national for hacking seven National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) systems, according to a 
testimony from a NASA official to Congress.110   
 
While Washington waits to see if Beijing will prosecute these hackers, the 
more important takeaway is China’s demonstration of its willingness to work 
with the United States–and perhaps by extension other governments as well–
on similar cyber issues, something that had not been done previously.  
Sanctions still loom large on the table if perceived Beijing-sponsored hacking 
against commercial interests does not abate; however, if handled correctly, 
the threat of sanctions may ultimately serve China’s interests by addressing 
head-on the biggest black mark against China.  Holding fast to the principles 
of legal and media warfare, China’s assurance of “opposing cyber attacks and 
espionage and combating all forms of hacking activities in accordance with 
the law,”111 coupled with public examples of collaborating with stakeholders 
toward this end, may gradually assuage opponents’ concern of the “China 
threat,” and in turn, depict China as a willing partner instead of an antagonist.  
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Additionally, initiating additional cyber security cooperation with regional 
governments will further bolster China’s message of seeking a stable Internet, 
safe from criminal and terrorist activities.  China has been active in this 
regard, engaging in cyber security discussions with Japan,112 Malaysia,113 and 
South Korea,114 as well as a series of no-hack pacts leading to the November 
2015 G20 agreement to not conduct cyber-enabled commercial espionage.115 
 
It can be expected that China will pursue more of these through independent 
bilateral meetings or through international organizations like the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite being accused of perpetrating long running and substantial cyber 
espionage campaigns against the United States as well as several other 
countries, China has escaped any significant punitive or economic 
repercussions.  China’s “Three Warfares,” a three-pronged information 
warfare strategy designed to influence the international community, has 
played an important role in forestalling any significant deterrence response, 
while allowing China to promote itself as a viable partner in cyberspace.  
China has sought to dull public perception of its rising threat by denying 
accusations, while capitalizing on the Snowden leaks of U.S. global 
surveillance activities to tarnish the U.S. image.  Concurrently, China has used 
legal mechanisms to help promote itself as a viable cybersecurity partner.  
The act of championing the right of every state to be included on Internet 
governance gained enough traction to encourage the U.S. to step down from 
its governing role.  Providing the UN with an updated “code of conduct” for 
nation state behavior in cyberspace demonstrated its interest to the global 
community that it was leading efforts toward achieving stability in cyber 
space.  Updating its cyber-crime legislation exhibited Beijing’s commitment 
                                                     
112 “S.Korea, Japan, China to Hold Cyber Policy Talks,” Yonhap News Agency, October 13, 
2015, available at: 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2015/10/13/0200000000AEN2015101300480
0315.html. 
113 “Malaysia, China to Work Together on Cyber Crimes,” The Malay Mail Online, August 
22, 2014, available at: 
http://www.themalaymailonline.com/malaysia/article/malaysia-china-to-work-
together-to-combat-cyber-crimes. 
114 “S.Korea, Japan, China to Hold Cyber Policy Talks.”  
115 Ellen Nakashima, “World’s Richest Nations Agree Hacking for Commercial Benefits Is 
Off-Limits,” The Washington Post, November 16, 2015, available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/worlds-richest-nations-
agree-hacking-for-commercial-benefit-is-off-limits/2015/11/16/40bd0800-8ca9-11e5-
acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html. 
Iasiello: China’s Three Warfares Strategy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
 68 
 
toward penalizing those engaged in hacking, quickly followed by arresting 
suspected hackers at the U.S. behest in 2015.116  Finally, China’s use of 
psychological operations (PSYOPS) has presented itself as a law abiding 
stakeholder in cyberspace while quietly basking in the writings that have 
identified it as a significant cyber power.  The more experts warn of China’s 
powerful cyber capabilities, the more of a cyber equal China is perceived to be 
without Beijing ever having to intimate it. 
 
As a result, the confluence of these three strategies has kept the West from 
deterring suspected Chinese espionage for a substantial period of time.  In 
fact, the more time that has been allowed to elapse, the more China has been 
able to take advantage of it.  In the time that the U.S. has mulled over finally 
levying cyber sanctions against China, Beijing has capitalized on meeting with 
countries like Japan and South Korea on cyber security issues,117 as well as 
engaging in a series of “no hack pacts” between China and Russia,118 the 
United Kingdom, 119 and the United States,120 an effort culminating in the 
historic November 2015 agreement by members of the G20 to not engage in 
cyber-enabled espionage for commercial advantage.121 
 
Moreover, China has done this while becoming the world’s largest economy in 
the process, and while promoting itself as a regional leader by spearheading 
efforts for a Maritime Silk Road (a system of linked ports, projects and special 
economic zones in Southeast Asia and the northern Indian Ocean122) and the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (which already has 20 governments on 
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board).123 China’s plan may just be to rise through its region first before 
ascending to a global throne brought on by some of the fruits of its espionage 
efforts.  In this context, China’s cyber espionage can be viewed as less about 
reducing U.S. capability, and more about building itself to assume a larger 
status in the world. 
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